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Luthi: Securities - Oil and Gas Leases: Should They Be Considered Securi

SECURITIES-Oil and Gas Leases: Should They be Considered Securities? Shepperd v. Boettcher & Company, Inc., 613 F. Supp. 287 (D.
Wyo. 1985), appeal docketed, No. 85-2235 (Aug. 16, 1985).
Rex A. Shepperd and Steve Edwards (Shepperd) invested in undivided fractional working interests in oil, gas, and mineral leases offered
through the Casper office of Boettcher & Company, Inc. (Boettcher).' The
leaseholds were located in Louisiana and were operated by Latham Exploration Co., Inc. (Lexco). Relying upon Boettcher, Shepperd entered into
two participation agreements for $142,982.23 each and received a one and
two-thirds percent working interest in the drilling operations. Shepperd
bore a proportional share of the risks and costs but received no management rights or control over the drilling operations. Shepperd alleged that
because of financial circumstances not disclosed to him prior to his purchase of the working interests, including the existence of liens on Lexco
property and assets, Lexco was forced to file2 for bankruptcy. Shepperd
lost nearly three hundred thousand dollars.
In his complaint, Shepperd argued that the working interests were
within the meaning of
investment contracts and therefore "securities"
3
the Wyoming Uniform Securities Act. He asserted that, as securities,
these working interests should have been registered pursuant to section
17-4-107(a)(i) of the Wyoming Statutes or exempted pursuant to section
17-4-114(a)(i-ix) prior to any offer or sale within the State of Wyoming.
Since the working interests were not registered or exempted, Shepperd
asserted that the sale was unlawful. Therefore, pursuant to 4 section
17-4-122(a)(ii), he should be entitled to recover from Boettcher.
In reply, Boettcher claimed that the working interests were not
"securities" as defined by the Wyoming Statutes, that the complaint failed
to state a cause of action, and therefore asked that the complaint be
dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5
The district court agreed with Boettcher, finding that "neither Wyo.
Stat. § 17-4-113(a)(xi) (1977) nor the security regulation on investment contracts encompass working interests in oil, gas, or mining titles or leases
for failure
...within the definition of 'security.' "6 The case was dismissed
7
granted.
be
could
relief
which
upon
to state a claim
1. Shepperd v. Boettcher & Co., Inc., 613 F. Supp. 287, 288 (D. Wyo. 1985), appeal
docketed, No. 85-2235 (Aug. 16, 1985).
2. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 1-2, Shepperd
v. Boettcher & Co., Inc. 613 F. Supp. 287 (D. Wyo. 1985) [hereinafter Memorandum in
Opposition].
3. WYo. STAT. §§ 17-4-101 to -129 (1977 & Supp. 1985).
4. Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 2,at 2.
5. Memorandum Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 2, Shepperd
v. Boettcher & Co., Inc., 613 F. Supp. 287 (D. Wyo. 1985) [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss].
6. Boettcher, 613 F. Supp at 291.
7. Id
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BACKGROUND

The FractionalUndivided Interest
Unique forms of financing have evolved with the growth of the commercial petroleum industry. One such form involves the development of
a privately-owned geographic area with oil-producing potential. Once a
favorable geologist's report is issued, representatives of producers and
speculators endeavor to lease as many of the individual tracts as they can.'
If the lessee company's resources are insufficent to develop the tract,
the lessee may sell fractional undivided shares of the lease to raise working capital. Or, the lessee may give a part interest to a drilling contractor, who in turn may sell his share to finance the drilling. These undivided fractional shares are called "working interests." Often, as was the case
with Shepperd, the purchasers of these fractional undivided working interests assume a proportionate share of the costs and risks incurred in
the operation. 9
The Purpose of Securities Regulation
The regulation of securities began in this country in the early twentieth century. The first substantive statute was enacted in Kansas in 1911.
The term "blue sky law" was apparently coined in Kansas to describe
legislation aimed at promoters who would "sell building lots in the blue
sky in fee simple."'" Kansas' lead was ultimately followed by the rest of
the states so that today, every state, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico has some form of blue sky law."
The purpose of securities regulation is basically twofold: to protect
investors and to police affirmative disclosure of corporate information.12
Since the vast majority of investors have no control over the entities in
which they invest, one role of government is to protect these investors.
This protection is largely accomplished by state and federal securities
legislation."
8. L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 183 (1983). The lessor usually
receives a rental fee for the years during which no drilling takes place, a percentage of the
oil or gas produced or its market value, and in some cases, the lessor will also receive an
immediate cash bonus. The percentage is usually 1/8, although 1/6 has become popular in
the last several years. The lessor's percentage interest is called the "landowner's royalty
interest." The lessee's interest (7/8ths) is called the "working interest." Id. at 183-84.
9. Id at 183-85.
10. Id. at 8 (citing Mulvey, Blue Sky Law, 36 CAN. L.T. 37 (1916)).
11. Loss, supra note 8, at 8.
12. Id. at 3. In 1980, the New York Stock Exchange estimated that thirty million individuals owned shares of publicly held corporations. This figure represents one in every
four American adults. In addition, approximately one hundred and thirty-three million people have an indirect interest in the market through life insurance, pension plans, and other
intermediaries. Id at 5 (citing N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE, SHAREOWNERSHIP 1980, at i (1981)).
13. Professor Loss lists several concerns in the securities arena that required legislative
attention including the
failure to furnish essential information to prospective investors when they were
invited to buy securities[; ... the common law limitations on civil recovery
by injured investors; the inadequacy of current information concerning com-
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Congress' major thrust at federal securities regulation, prompted by
the crash of 1929 and the subsequent Great Depression, came in the form
of the Securities Act of 1933.' In the words of the United States Supreme
Court, the purpose of the securities statutes was "to substitute a
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus
5
to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry."
Amendments to the the Securities Act of 1933 removed any doubt
that Congress intended fractional interests in oil and gas rights to be
regulated as securities.' 6 The Act, as amended, states: "The term 'security' means any ... fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral
rights. ... ""

The Uniform Securities Act
To unify the various blue sky laws, the American Bar Association and
the National Conference of Commissioners and Uniform State Laws promulgated the Uniform Securities Act in 1959.18 Prior to its drafting, no
panies with publicly held securities; the abuse of the proxy device by selfperpetuating managements; the abuse by corporate "insiders" of their favored
position in order to trade in their corporations' securities for their own profit;
the "private club" atmosphere of the Nation's securities exchanges; the ease
with which the securities markets could be manipulated; the lack of financial
safeguards for brokers and dealers; the disproportionate amount of the Nation's available credit that at times was channeled into the securities markets
at the expense, it was thought, of direct financing of commerce and industry;
the practices of protective committees in corporate reorganizations; the abuses
of the holding company and investment company devices; and the irresponsibility of trustees under corporate bond indentures.
Id. at 6-7.
14. 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77aa (1982)). Following the Securities Act of 1933, Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48
Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78kk (1982)); the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 838 (1935) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79
to 79z-6 (1982)); the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1149 (1934) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa to 77bbbb (1982)); the Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789
(1940) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (1982)); the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 847 (1940) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1982));
and finally the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1636 (1970) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa to 78111 (1982)).
15. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (italics in
original).
16. Loss, supra note 8, at 185.
17. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982). The entire section reads:
(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any
profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate
or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest of oil, gas,
or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest
therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or
privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing.
18. UNIF. SECURITIES ACT, 7B U.L.A. 509 (1985).
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two states had identical blue sky laws.19 Under the Uniform Act's definition section, the draftsmen substituted the wording "any certificate of
interest or participation in an oil, gas, or mining title or lease or in
payments out of production under such a title or lease" for the phrase
"fractional undivided interest" found in the 1933 Act.20 However, the intent is still clear; oil and gas payments are securities whether or not they
are regarded as interests in a title or lease. 2' Wyoming adopted the
Uniform Securities Act with some revisions in 1965.22
THE PRINCIPAL CASE

In the principal case, the issue confronting the district court was
whether fractional undivided working interests in oil and gas leases should
be considered as investment contracts and therefore securities, given the
legislative exclusion of such working interests from the definition of security. Shepperd argued that even though the Wyoming statute failed to
specifically include working interests in oil and gas leases within the definition of securities, such working interests could be included under the term
"investment contract." Therefore, the working interests should have been
registered or exempted from registration prior to sale or solicitation.23
Boettcher's motion to dismiss was based on the concept that the
Wyoming legislature never intended such working interests to be regulated. Boettcher's argument was threefold. First, when the Wyoming
legislature adopted the Uniform Securities Act, the reference to working
interests in oil and gas leases was excluded. Second, prior Wyoming
securities law was silent on the issue of oil and gas leases. 25 Finally, a 1962
Wyoming Attorney General Opinion had maintained that such interests
19. Loss & COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 18 (1958).
20. UNIF. SECURITIES ACT, supranote 18, § 401(1) comment at 583. The comment reads:
This section is identical with § 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(1)... except for oil, gas and mineral interests.... Section 2(1) was modeled
on the definitions in some of the state statutes, and the federal definition has
in turn influenced many of the new state statutes enacted since 1933. Moreover,
substantially that definition-particularly the phrase "investment contract"has been broadly construed by both state and federal courts....
Oil, gas and mineral interests: Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933
uses the phrase "fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral
rights." The phrase in this statute is modeled on the language in § 25008(a)
of the California act-"certificate of interest in an oil, gas, or mining title or
lease"-which may be slightly broader than the federal phrase and in any event
is by far the most commonly found phrase in the state statutes. The words
which have been added to the California language are intended to make it clear
that so-called "oil payments" are securities whether or not they may be regarded
as interests in a title or lease. Very few states go so far as to include entire
leasehold interests. However, it is clear that even entire leasehold interests
may be offered under such circumstances that a security is involved in the
nature of an "investment contract."
21. I&
22. Wyoming Securities Act, ch. 160, 1965 Wyo. Sess. Laws 410.
23. Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 2, at 2.

24. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 5, at 3. See DIGEST OF WYOMING
S. 10, at 56 (1965) [hereinafter DIGEST]. See also WYO.
25. See WYo. STAT. § 17-102 (1959).

JOURNALS,
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were not intended to be securities under Wyoming law.26 The court, with

little embellishment, accepted Boettcher's arguments and granted the mo27
tion to dismiss.
ANALYSIS

The landmark federal case concerning the issue of which transactions
in oil and gas constitute securities is SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp. 28
In that case, the defendant argued that because the statutory definition
of security mentioned "fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other29
mineral rights," it excluded sales of leasehold subdivisions by parcels.
The Court recognized that not every transaction involving the sale of a
fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights was ipso
facto the sale of a security. Such leases were important as "indispensable
instruments of legitimate oil exploration and production."" Yet, they were
"notorious subjects of speculation and fraud" and needed to be regulated21
To avoid burdening the oil industry with controls designed for securities,
Congress specifically included as securities "only that form of splitting
up of mineral interests which had been most utilized for speculative
purposes. 3 2 The Court went on to explain: "We do not think the drafts-

men thereby immunized other forms of contracts and offerings which are
proved as a matter of fact to answer to such descriptive terms as 'investment contracts' and 'securities.' ,,33

Investment Contracts as Securities
The United States Supreme Court has provided a test for defining
an investment contract. In reversing a decision by an appellate court,
Justice Murphy wrote: "The test [for an investment contract] is whether
the scheme involves: [1] an investment of money [2] in a common enterprise [3] with profits to come solely from the efforts of others. ' ' 3,
The third element of this test has been modified at the appellate level
so that "solely" should now be read as "substantially." 35 In SEC v. Glenn
W. Turner Enterprises,Inc.,36 the ninth circuit, after analyzing the purpose of securities regulation, the statutory policy of giving broad protec26. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 5, at 4-5.
27. Shepperd, 613 F. Supp. at 290-91.
28. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
29. Id at 352.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id (emphasis added).
34. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). Howey was another landmark
in the area of securities law. The case involved the sale of strips of land in various citrus
groves in Florida, along with a service contract for the care and harvest of the fruit. The
court held the offer to be an investment contract and thus subject to the provisions of the
Securities Act of 1933.
35. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973). See also
Mihaly & Kaufmann, Securities, in N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW art. 23-A, at 6, 14 (McKinney 1984).
36. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
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tion to the public, and the Supreme Court's directive that the term "security" should be flexibly defined, held that "the word 'solely' should not
be read as a strict or literal limitation on the definition of an investment
contract, but rather must be construed realistically, so as to include within
the definition those schemes which involve in substance, if not form,
securities."37 The court went on to rule that a transaction involves an investment contract, and hence a security, when the investor must rely on
the promoter's efforts and has no practical control over his investment.38
The Wyoming Supreme Court explicitly adopted the Howey definition in
1982.19

In the instant case, Shepperd sought to have his working interests
defined as "investment contracts.' "40There is persuasive support for such
an interpretation. In Woodward v. Wright,4' the court held that:

[A] fractional undivided interest in oil and gas becomes a "security" when it is created out of the ownership of an interest in oil
and gas or other mineral rights for the purpose of sale or offering
for sale. Correlatively, the sale or offering for sale of an oil and
gas lease, or an undivided interest therein, may be the sale of an
"investment contract,"hence a security, when the transaction carries with it something more than the assignment of a "naked
leasehold right," as where the purchasers look entirely to the efforts of 42other persons to make their investment a profitable
venture.
The district court failed to reach the question of whether the working
interests purchased by Shepperd were investment contracts under the
Howey test. The case was dismissed on Boettcher's motion that Shepperd failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Boettcher
based its motion for dismissal on the claim that the Wyoming legislature
intended to exclude working interests in oil and43gas from the definition
of security under the Wyoming Securities Act.
Legislative Intent
The legislature modified the Uniform Securities Act by deleting the
phrase "certificate of interest or participation in an oil, gas or mining title or leases or payments out of production under such a title or lease"
from the definitions section. 44 Judge Kerr was persuaded that the deletion indicated the legislature's intent to exclude from regulation under
the Wyoming Act the types of interests Shepperd had purchased. 45 The
district court also considered it significant that prior Wyoming securities
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id at 482.
Id. at 483.
Gaudina v. Haberman, 644 P.2d 159, 166 (Wyo. 1982).
Shepperd, 613 F. Supp. at 288.
Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1959).
Id. at 112 (emphasis added).
Motion to Dismiss, supra note 5, at 2.
DIGEST, supra note 24, at 56.
Shepperd, 613 F. Supp. at 290.
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law was silent regarding oil and gas leasing. 6 To explain this silence, Boettcher and the court relied on a 1962 Wyoming Attorney General's opinion
interpreting this provision. 47 The Attorney General determined that such
interests were not intended to be securities because the Wyoming
statutory definition of
security made no mention whatever of interests
4
in oil and gas leases.

1

Another Attorney General opinion, however, issued in 1953 reached
an opposite conclusion. In that opinion, the Attorney General concluded:
From the foregoing discussion and the definition contained in our
own Blue Sky Law it would appear that any instrument sold or
offered for sale to the public by any person, firm or corporation
evidencing or representing any right to participate or share in the
profits or earnings or distribution of assets
of any business car49
ried on for profit would be a security.
The 1962 Attorney General criticized this earlier opinion, saying it ran
afoul of legislative intent." Because the Wyoming securities statute made
no mention of mineral interests in oil and gas leases, he invoked the
academic doctrine of ejusdem generis to construe the law.5' Applying this
doctrine of construction, "it would be necessary to relate 'certificates of
46. Id. See Wyo. STAT. § 17-102 (1959). The text of the prior statute reads: "The term
'securities' as used in this Act [§§ 17-102 to 17-117] shall be taken to mean stock certificates,
shares, bonds, debentures, certificate of participation, contracts, or other instruments in the
nature thereof by whatsoever name known or called .. "
47. Op. Wyo. Att'y. Gen., No. 4, at 93, 95 (1962) [hereinafter 1962 A.G. Op.].
48. Shepperd, 613 F. Supp. at 290.
49. Op. Wyo. Att'y. Gen. 35-38 (1953). The opinon went on:
In your letter you ask a number of specific questions concerning certain oil
and gas transactions. We do not feel that this office can satisfactorily answer
these inquiries with the limited facts at our disposition. It appears that these
matters are largely dependent on the factual situations involved, and it is our
opinion that the local authorities are in a much better position to decide as
to what action, if any, is to be brought on the basis of the facts that are peculiarly within their knowledge. Perhaps a quotation from 79 C.J.S. 943, 944 will
better explain our position:
"***in determining whether a particular instrument is or is not a security the
courts will look to the substance and not to the form of the transaction, and
will examine the instrument in the light of the purpose to be accomplished by
its issuance, and all surrounding circumstances.***"
Id. at 37-38. From this, it appears that the attorney general in 1953 accepted the broad interpretation of security as expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Joiner and
Howey.
50. 1962 A.G. Op., supra note 47, at 94.
51. Id. at 95. "The doctrine of ejusdem generis is a well known rule of construction
to aid in ascertaining the meaning of statutes and other written instruments, the doctrine
being that where an enumeration of specific things is followed by some more general word.
or phrase, such general phrase is to be held to refer to things of the same kind as those
enumerated." Aleksich v. Industrial Accident Fund, 116 Mont. 127, 151 P.2d 1016, 1021
(1944). "Ejusdem generis. Of the same kind, class, or nature.... [T]he "ejusdem generis
rule" is, that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of
a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest
extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind
or class as those specifically mentioned .... The rule, however, does not necessarily require that the generalprovision be limited in its scope to the identical things specifically
named ....
" Blacks Law Dictionary 464 (5th Ed. 1979) (emphasis added).
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participation' back to the type of instruments specifically described. Obviously, a fractional 52undivided working interest.., would not constitute
such a certificate.

The United States Supreme Court, however, specifically rejected the
ejusdem generis rule in SEC v. Joiner. There, the Court noted:
We cannot read out of the statute these general descriptive
designations merely because more specific ones have been used
to reach some kinds of documents. Instruments may be included
within any of these definitions, as matter of law, if on their face
they answer to the name or description. However, the reach of the
Act does not stop with the obvious and commonplace. Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they appear to be, are also
reached if it be proved as matter of fact that they were widely
offered or dealt in under terms or courses of dealing which established their character in commerce as "investment contracts," or
as "any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security.'
Regarding rules of construction, the Court also noted:
However well these rules may serve at times to aid in deciphering legislative intent, they long have been subordinated to the doctrine that courts will construe the details of an act in conformity
with its dominating general purpose, will read text in the light
of context and will interpret the text so far as the meaning of the
in particular cases the
words fairly permits so as to carry out
4
generally expressed legislative policy.

The Supreme Court has further instructed that remedial legislation
such as securities law should be broadly interpreted to protect the public
from speculative or fraudulent schemes.5 5 Wyoming courts have followed
this admonition. In Gaudina v. Haberman,the Wyoming Supreme Court
approvingly quoted language from SEC v. Glenn W. Turner, that the term
"security" should be defined broadly and the definition liberally
construed. 56 The Wyoming court also noted with approval an Oregon case
pointing out that the court's aim "is to construe the securities laws liberally so as to afford the greatest possible protection to the public."57 The
proper interpretation of the legislation is clear. However, the intent of the
legislature is not as clear as the district court would make it appear.
Boettcher and the district court felt the omission of working interests
in oil and gas leases implied that the Wyoming legislature intended to
52. 1962 A.G. Op., supra note 47, at 94.
53. Joiner,320 U.S. at 351. Footnote eight to the Joiner opinion further reveals the
Court's opinion of the ejusdem generis device. "This Court has refused to follow the ejusdem
generis rule. . . where its applicationseemed to conflict with the generalpurpose of an act."
(emphasis added).
54. Id. at 350, 351 (emphasis added).
55. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
56. Gaudina v. Haberman, 644 P.2d 159, 165 (1982) (citing SEC v. Glenn W. Turner
Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 480 (9th Cir. 1973)).
57. Haberman,644 P.2d at 166 (referring to Marshall v. Harris, 276 Or. 447, 555 P.2d
756 (1976)).
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exclude such offerings from regulation. Determining the intent of the Wyoming legislature is no easy task, however. Aside from the Wyoming Senate
and House Journals, no other official record is available. Committee recommendations consist of little more than "Do pass," "Do pass as amended," and "Do not pass." Noticeably absent are detailed committee reports.
Further, there is no record of floor debate, no record of committee hearings, and no official minutes of committee meetings are kept. This scarcity of historical information makes compiling a legislative history in
Wyoming difficult.
Boettcher argued that the failure of the legislature to include such
working interests indicated legislative acquiesence in the Attorney
General's opinion that working interests in oil and gas leases were immune from statutory regulation. 58 Indeed, such an assumption might be
logically attributed to the Wyoming legislature's action. But it is not the
only or most reasonable conclusion that can be reached. The legislature's
impetus in adopting the Uniform Securities Act was to provide protection to the investing public. It seems illogical, therefore, to construe the
statute so as to shield from regulation those very instruments that the
United States Supreme Court has called "notorious subjects of speculation and fraud." 59 Moreover, it seems more plausible to interpret the
broader language of the statute as encompassing such interests. Furthermore, if the legislature intended to exclude working interests in oil and
gas, it could have expressly done so. It did just that with insurance and
endowment policies and annuity contracts.6 0 Absent a clearer indication
of legislative intent, legislative approval of a scheme having such serious
implications should not have been so lightly inferred by the district court.
CONCLUSION

Wyoming adopted the Uniform Securities Act to protect her citizens
against securities fraud. In applying a statute such as this to a specific
transaction, one must determine the general purpose of the legislation.
The reading given the Wyoming statute by the district court disregards
the general purpose of the regulation and ignores the counsel of the United
States Supreme Court that "courts [should] construe the details of an act
in conformity with its dominatinggeneralpurpose."61 In determining that
interests in oil, gas, and mining leases are not securities, the district court
leaves Wyoming standing conspicuously alone. All other states and the
federal government regard these interests to be securities."2
58. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 5, at 5.
59. Joiner, 320 U.S. at 352.
60. WYo. STAT. 17-4-113(a)(xi) (1977). The statute states that the term security "does
not include any insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract under which an insurance
company promises to pay a fixed number of dollars either in a lump sum or periodically for
life or some other specified period."
61. Joiner,320 U.S. at 350-51 (emphasis added).
62. ALA. CODE § 8-6-2(10) (1984); ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.130(12) (1980); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 44-1801(16) (1967 & Supp. 1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1247(l)(1) (Supp. 1985); CAL.
CORP. CODE § 25019 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-102(14) (Supp. 1984);
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The district court's decision in this case seem incongruous with the

statutory policy of affording broad protection to investors6 3 and the
Supreme Court's admonition that a flexible rather than static principle
be applied when interpreting securities legislation. Securities legislation
is remedial in nature and consequently, a liberal interpretation should have
been given the term security. With this decision, the need to afford broad
protection to the investing public apparently receives no welcome in
Wyoming.
Wyoming securities law should include undivided fractional working
interests in oil, gas and mineral leases, and could be so read without doing violence to the statute. The Wyoming legislature, however, should
amend the statute to include oil, gas, and mineral leases under the definition of securities.
JEFFERY

N.

LUTHI

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-471(m) (West 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7302(13) (1974);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-2601(12) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.021(20) (West Supp. 1985); GA.
CODE ANN. § 10-5-2(16) (1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 485-1(12) (1976 & Supp. 1984); IDAHO
CODE § 30-1402(12) (1980 & Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, § 137.2-1 (Smith-Hurd
1985); IND. CODE § 23-1-1(k) (Burns 1984 & Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.102(12) (West
Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17"1252(j) (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.310(13) (Bobb-

Merrill 1981 & Supp. 1984); Louisiana: See Caldwell v.Trans-Gulf Petroleum Corp., 322 So.2d
171 (La. 1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10501.18. (Supp. 1985); MD. CoRPs. & Ass'NS
CODE ANN. § 11-101(o)(1((xiv) (1985 & Supp. 1985); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 110A, § 401(k)
(Michie/Law. Co-op. 1985); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 451.801(l) (West Supp. 1985); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 80A.14 (Subd. 18) (West Supp. 1985); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-71-105(k) (Supp.
1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 409.401(l) (Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-103(11) (1983);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1101(12) (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 90.090 (1983; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 421-B:2, XX (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-49(m) (West 1970 & Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 58-13-2(H) (1984 & Supp. 1985); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352(1) (McKinney 1984); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 78A-2(11) (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-0212 (1976 & Supp. 1983); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.01(B) (Baldwin 1979 & Supp. 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 2(20)(R)
(West Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 59.015(13)(a) (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. § 61-1-13(17) (Supp.
1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-11-1(c) (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-20(12) (Law. Co-op. 1976 &

Supp. 1984); S.D.

CODIFIED LAWS ANN.

(1984 & Supp. 1985);
VT. STAT. ANN.

§ 47-31-1(4) (1983);

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 48-2-102(12)

581-4A (Vernon 1964); Vermont: See
tit. 9, § 4202(9) (1984). The section reads:" 'Security' shall include land situated
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.

outside the state, any note, stock, share, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, beneficial
interest in title to property, profits or earnings, and any other instrument, whether of the
same or of a different kind, commonly known as a security, and any certificate, contract,
or instrument representing an interest in any of the foregoing"; VA. CODE § 13.1-501(j) (1978);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 21.20.005(12) (1978 & West Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE § 32-4-401(l)
(1982); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 551.02(13)(a) (West Supp. 1985).
63. Howey, 328 U.S. at 301.
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